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Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages
Michael F. Sturley*
It was a personal pleasure for me to participate in this
impressive symposium on punitive damages. Not only did I
appreciate the opportunity to share views with new friends and old
during my visit to Baton Rouge, but the student members of the
Louisiana Law Review did a superb job organizing the symposium,
and I thank them for their hospitality.
I. DISCLOSURES
To put my comments into perspective, I should begin with
three disclosures. Most importantly, I am not a fan of punitive
damages law as currently administered in the United States.
Although this position puts me in the company of many of my
conservative friends, I nevertheless consider it one of my liberal
views. Accepting the current premise that punitive damages are
intended to punish those who are guilty of particularly egregious
misconduct (and thus to deter others from similar misconduct),' I
believe that punishment should be imposed only when suitable
safeguards are in place to protect the accused wrongdoer. We do
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* Stanley D. and Sandra J. Rosenberg Centennial Professor of Law,
University of Texas at Austin; B.A., J.D., Yale University; M.A.
(Jurisprudence), Oxford University. I was a member of the legal team
representing the Exxon interests in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker (Exxon), 128 S.
Ct. 2605 (2008), which is discussed in this Article. But I write here solely in my
academic capacity, and the views I express are my own. They do not necessarily
represent the views of, and they have not been endorsed or approved by, my
former clients or my former co-counsel.
An earlier version of this Article was delivered at a symposium on punitive
damages held at the LSU Paul M. Hebert Law Center in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, on April 17, 2009, which was jointly sponsored by the Louisiana
Law Review and the LSU Center for Continuing Professional Development.
1. This premise is often expressed in modem cases. Historically, punitive
damages appear to have served a compensatory function, effectively allowing
plaintiffs to receive more adequate compensation than was then available under
unduly restrictive tort doctrines at the time. The argument is still made today
that punitive damages serve a valuable role by supplementing inadequate
compensatory damages. Indeed, some of the amicus briefs filed at the Supreme
Court in Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605, made that argument. But the "extra
compensation" argument is less commonly accepted today. In any event, I do
not find the argument persuasive. If compensatory damages are still inadequate,
that problem should be addressed directly so that it can be corrected in all
cases-not only in those rare cases in which a defendant is found to be guilty of
egregious misconduct.
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not permit the state to fine a criminal defendant under a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, 2 or for misconduct that
has not been clearly defined in advance.3 Criminal fines are subject
to a host of constitutional, statutory, and procedural safeguards. In
my view, the policy concerns that support these important
safeguards do not disappear simply because we categorize punitive
damages as part of the "civil" law rather than the "criminal" law.4
To the extent that you believe that the views I express here on the
state of the law of vicarious liability for punitive damages may
2. States are divided on the standard of proof required for the imposition of
punitive damages. Compare, e.g., Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 95 P.3d
977, 983 (Idaho 2004) (applying preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to
impose punitive damages), with, e.g., Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co.,
723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986) (requiring clear and convincing evidence
because punitive damages are "only to be awarded in the most egregious of
cases, where there is reprehensible conduct combined with an evil mind," thus
making it "appropriate to impose a more stringent standard of proof'). It appears
that only Colorado requires a plaintiff to meet the criminal standard-proof
beyond a reasonable doubt-to impose punitive damages. See COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 2005).
The Supreme Court has described the "clear and convincing" standard under
state law as "an important check against unwarranted imposition of punitive
damages." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 433 (1994). But in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 n. 11 (1991), the Court held
that the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard did not violate the Due
Process Clause.
Inln re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1232-33 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'don other
grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008), the Ninth Circuit held that federal maritime law
permitted punitive damages under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard even
though that award would not have been permitted in any of the coastal states in the
Ninth Circuit. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (2006) (requiring clear and
convincing evidence); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2009)
(same); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (same); Masaki v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 573-75 (1989) (same). Washington does not
permit punitive damages except as authorized by statute. See, e.g., Fisher Props.,
Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986).
3. If a criminal statute authorized the imposition of criminal fines under
the same standards that courts have used to describe the circumstances in which
punitive damages can be awarded, it would be void for vagueness. See
generally, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3 (4th ed. 2003)
(describing the "void for vagueness" doctrine in criminal law).
4. I recognize that, under U.S. law, a great deal turns on the historical
accident that we categorize punitive damages as part of the "civil" law rather
than the "criminal" law. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc. (Browning-Ferris), 492 U.S. 257, 262-76 (1989) (holding that the
Eighth Amendment constrains the state's exercise of its criminal authority and
does not apply to an award of punitive damages in a civil law dispute between
private parties). Of course, Browning-Ferris addressed an issue of constitutional
interpretation, not the wisdom of imposing punitive damages without
meaningful safeguards.
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have been influenced by my wider views on punitive damages
generally (as I believe that judges' views on the subject are likely
to be influenced by their wider views about punitive damages), you
may wish to discount my conclusions accordingly.
Secondly, I must also note what might be seen as a personal
financial interest in the subject. I was retained by Exxon Mobil
Corporation to assist in its presentation of Exxon Shippging Co. v.
Baker (Exxon) before the United States Supreme Court. One issue
in that case was vicarious liability for punitive damages. You may
believe that this representation colored my current conclusions. My
own belief is that my current views were already well-formed
before Exxon retained me, but you can decide for yourself. I hasten
to add that the views I express here are entirely my own. I do not
speak here for any of my former clients or co-counsel, and they
may or may not agree with what I say.
Finally, I should explicitly mention what is already clear from
my resume: my relevant expertise lies in the field of maritime law
rather than general tort law. I will discuss tort law as it has been
applied in the states, but I will focus much more on maritime law
than one who specializes primarily in torts might do. Although it
may seem odd for the organizers of this symposium to invite a
maritime specialist to address an issue that is so central to general
tort law, particularly when punitive damages are so rarely awarded
in maritime cases, I see the logic in their choice. Not only is
maritime law the field in which the most interesting recent
developments on vicarious liability have occurred,7 it is also the
field in which future developments are most likely to be broadly
influential. 8
5. 128 S. Ct. 2605.
6. Professor Robertson's exhaustive research documenting all of the U.S.
maritime cases in which punitive damages were discussed found only about a
dozen examples of actual punitive damages awards during the preceding two
centuries. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Maritime
Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 73 (1997). And even with such a small sample,
some have questioned whether all of those few cases in fact involved punitive
awards. See, e.g., Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2571-79
(2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
7. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (noting the Supreme
Court's recent decision (or non-decision) in Exxon, 128 S. Ct. 2605).
8. See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
that a maritime decision on vicarious liability for punitive damages, particularly
by the Supreme Court, might have outside of maritime law).
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II. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF THE ISSUE
The extent to which an employer, principal, or master9 is liable
for punitive damages based on the egregious misconduct of an
employee, agent, or servant'0 has been a contentious issue for most
of the nation's history. The Supreme Court first addressed the
question almost two centuries ago in The Amiable Nancy." Less
than two years ago, the Court agreed to revisit the issue when it
granted certiorari in Exxon. 2 The Exxon Court divided equally on
the vicarious liability question, however, and was thus unable to
render ang, decision (and no Justice addressed the issue in an
opinion). In the 190 years between The Amiable Nancy and
Exxon, a number of different approaches developed and endured,
with the result that no single solution to the problem is accepted
today.
It may be helpful to focus on exactly what is at stake here, and
a simplified hypothetical based on the Exxon facts may serve as a
useful illustration. Suppose that a corporate shipowner employs a
captain to operate a supertanker on voyages between Alaska and
California. The company complies with industry standards in the
hiring and training of the entire crew, including the captain, and
also establishes and enforces appropriate policies for the operation
of its vessels. The captain nevertheless violates the company policy
and leaves the bridge while the ship is sailing through the
environmentally sensitive waters of Prince William Sound. That
action leaves only one officer on the bridge (a violation of the
company's explicit two-officer policy), and that remaining officer
lacks the Coast Guard license necessary to navigate the vessel in
9. The terms "employer," "principal," and "master" have been popular at
different times in our legal history and to some extent in different contexts. In
the nineteenth century, the law commonly spoke of "master" and "servant." For
the last several decades, those terms have been generally replaced by "principal"
and "agent" (which has a somewhat different meaning) or "employer" and
"employee." In the present context, we are almost always concerned with
employers and employees.
10. The terms "employee," "agent," and "servant" have been popular at
different times in our legal history and to some extent in different contexts. See
supra note 9.
11. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
12. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 552 U.S. 989 (2007) (granting
certiorari to In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2007)). The vicarious
liability issue was raised in the first "question presented" in the petition for
certiorari.
13. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614-16 (2008).
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those waters. 14 After a disaster ensues, the jury concludes that the
captain acted recklessly in leaving the bridge and holds him
personally liable for a modest punitive damages award. The five
billion dollar question-the issue on which I focus here-is
whether the company may also be held liable for punitive damages
based solely on the captain's misconduct.15
To some extent, this is simply a problem in line-drawing. Like
most employers today (or at least like most employers against
whom plaintiffs seek substantial punitive damages awards), our
hypothetical shipowner is a corporation that can act only through
its agents. If the board of directors passed a resolution directing the
company's captains to abandon the bridge at key times, that
resolution would be an act of the corporation for which otherwise
appropriate sanctions could be imposed without considering
vicarious liability. Most would agree that the misconduct does not
need to rise to the level of a board resolution; at least some
employees' actions should be imputed to the corporation. If the
president of the company happened to be on board the vessel at the
fateful time, and in the course of her employment she had ordered
the captain to leave the bridge (perhaps to meet with her to discuss
company business), the president's decision would presumably be
imputed to the corporation.' 6 But how far down the corporate
structure should we go? Suppose that the captain had radioed the
14. The facts in my hypothetical may differ from the popular perception of
the Exxon Valdez facts (based on media reports), but they are essentially the
facts that were properly before the Supreme Court. Although the Exxon jury
heard hotly disputed testimony that would have supported the conclusion that
Exxon management had acted recklessly and that the captain had been
intoxicated at the time of the accident, no jury (in the immediate case or in any
of the related litigation) ever made either finding. The Exxon jury also heard
testimony sufficient to support the conclusion that Exxon management had acted
properly and that the captain had not been intoxicated at the time of the accident.
If the Exxon jury had been asked to address the issue and had found that the
corporate employer had acted recklessly in its own right, the vicarious liability
issue would never have arisen.
15. There is no question here regarding the corporate employer's liability
for compensatory damages based on the reckless actions of its employees. The
sole issue is the employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages.
16. If this variation of the hypothetical seems too improbable, perhaps we
could imagine a new passenger liner sailing across the north Atlantic in April on
her maiden voyage from Southampton to New York with the company president
on board. Despite reports of icebergs in the area, the company president might
recklessly instruct the captain to sail full speed ahead in order to reach New
York in record time. Cf DAviD RITCHIE, SHIPWRECKS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE WORLD'S WORST DISASTERS AT SEA 219-20 (1999) (noting that the Titanic
was proceeding at an unsafe speed, "possibly in response to pressure to make a
record crossing," and explaining that the company's president was "perceived as
a villain in the aftermath of the sinking").
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vice president responsible for overseeing the operations of the
company's fleet and had asked for permission to leave the bridge.
If that permission had been recklessly granted, would it have been
enough? Or is the captain's decision by itself enough to impose
liability on his employer? If the captain had been blameless but the
third mate had acted recklessly, would that have been enough? If
all of the officers had acted properly but the helmsman had
recklessly failed to execute their orders, would that have been
enough? If everyone on the bridge had acted properly but the
lookout had recklessly failed to perform her duties, would that
have been enough to impose liability on the corporate owner for
punitive damages?
As a theoretical matter, the law could establish a rule selecting
just about any point along the spectrum. As a practical matter, the
three most likely results are (1) the employee in question must be
one who is responsible for setting company policy,17 (2)8 the
employee must be one who acts in a "managerial" capacity,' or
(3) the employee must be acting within the scope of his or her
employment.
III. VicARIOus LIABILITY FOR PUNITIvE DAMAGES IN THE SUPREME
COURT
The Supreme Court has addressed an employer's liability for
punitive damages for the wrongful conduct of an employee several
times in somewhat different contexts. In the admiralty context,
which (in the absence of a statute) gives the Court broad discretion
to formulate the appropriate legal standard,2 ° The Amiable Nancy
involved an armed privateer's plundering of a neutral vessel during
the War of 1812. 2 1 The Court affirmed the shipowner-employer's
responsibility to pay compensatory damages to the owners of the
neutral vessel but expressly recognized the unfairness of holding
the employer vicariously liable in punitive damages for the
17. This appears to be the majority rule under general maritime law, which
has generally rejected an employer's liability in punitive damages for the
wrongdoing of lower level employees (including those who would be considered
"managerial"). See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
18. This is the position taken by the relevant Restatements. See infra notes
81-87 and accompanying text. It might also be the majority rule among the
states. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. But see infra note 76 and
accompanying text.
19. This may be the majority rule among the states. See infra note 76 and
accompanying text. But see infra note 79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
21. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
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wrongful conduct of the employees aboard the ship.22 It concluded
that the employer was not liable for punitive damages when the
employer did not direct, countenance, or participate "in the
slightest degree" in the wrong.23 As Justice Story, writing for the
unanimous Court, explained:
[T]his is a suit against the owners of the privateer ....
They are innocent of the demerit of this transaction, having
neither directed it, nor countenanced it, nor participated in
it in the slightest degree. Under such circumstances, we are
of opinion that they are bound to repair all the real injuries
and personal wrongs sustained by the [plaintiffs], but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive [i.e., punitive]
damages.24
Although Justice Story directly addressed the vicarious liability
issue, the authority of The Amiable Nancy on this point is
nevertheless open to question. The relevant statement is dictum,
25
and the case could be distinggished on its facts from any case that
is likely to arise today. 6  Many subsequent courts have
22. Id. at 558-59.
23. Id. at 559.
24. Id. at 558-59.
25. All of the Amiable Nancy statements about punitive damages are dicta.
The district court had not awarded punitive damages, and the Supreme Court's
opinion explicitly declared that "the only inquiry will be, whether any of the
items allowed by the district court were improperly rejected by the circuit
court." Id. at 559. The issue of punitive damages was not before the Court.
26. The Amiable Nancy Court appeared to put at least some weight on the
privateering context in which the case arose-a context that has been irrelevant
for a century and a half. That emphasis appears in one of the secondary
rationales that Justice Story included to support the Court's holding:
While the government of the country shall choose to authorize the
employment of privateers in its public wars, with the knowledge that
such employment cannot be exempt from occasional irregularities and
improper conduct, it cannot be the duty of courts ofjustice to defeat the
policy of the government, by burthening the service with a
responsibility beyond what justice requires, with a responsibility for
unliquidated damages, resting in mere discretion, and intended to
punish offenders.
Id. at 559. This secondary rationale may have been completely unnecessary-
Justice Story's effort to pound yet another nail into a coffin that was already
tightly sealed. But if this rationale was a serious part of the Court's motivation
to adopt its position (even in dicta), then the argument against vicarious liability
would be at least somewhat less compelling outside of the privateering context.
The broad language in Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v.
Prentice (Lake Shore), 147 U.S. 101 (1893), see infra at notes 35-42 and
accompanying text, would suggest that at least the Lake Shore Court did not find
the privateering context to be particularly relevant in The Amiable Nancy.
507
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nevertheless treated Justice Story's statement of the rule as strong
authority for limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages.w
Indeed, just a decade ago the Supreme Court itself cited The
Amiable Nancy for the proposition that the Court had
"historically . . endorsed" the view that "agency principles limit
vicarious liability for punitive awards., 28 And in one of its most
recent decisions, the Court attached considerable weight to The
Amiable Nancy's recognition that punitive damages are available
under the general maritime law.
29
The Amiable Nancy is also of limited help in the line-drawing
process noted above.3 Although the case is often cited to support
the proposition that a shipowner is not liable in punitive damages
for the misconduct of a ship's captain while at sea, the principal
wrongdoer was in fact a more junior officer.3 1 The privateer's
captain did not lead the boarding party that discovered that their
target was a neutral vessel (and nevertheless plundered her).32 The
guilty actor was the first lieutenant, 33 an officer less likely to be
considered an employee who acts in a "managerial capacity."34 But
at the very least, The Amiable Nancy represents a rejection (in
dictum) of the respondeat superior standard.
Despite the potential problems with The Amiable Nancy, the
Supreme Court subsequently applied the same rule in Lake Shore
& Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice (Lake Shore), which
held under (pre-Erie) federal common law that an injured
passenger could not recover punitive damages from a railroad
based on the misconduct of a conductor on a train. 35 Justice Gray,
27. See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
28. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 541 (1999) (citing The
Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 558-59). The Kolstad Court also cited
Lake Shore, 147 U.S. at 114-15, which is discussed infra at notes 35-42 and
accompanying text.
29. See At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2567 (2009). The
Amiable Nancy Court's recognition that punitive damages are available under the
general maritime law was every bit as much dictum as its declaration of the limits
on punitive damages in the context of vicarious liability. See supra note 25.
30. See supra text at notes 16-19.
31. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 547-48, 550-51.
32. Id. at 550-51.
33. Id. at 547.
34. Given the ambiguity of the phrase "managerial capacity," see infra
notes 86-87 and accompanying text, it is difficult to say how the first lieutenant
should be characterized. He did have command of an armed boat and the
boarding party, which reflects at least some level of "managerial" authority,
albeit less than the captain's.
35. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
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writing for the unanimous Court,36 explained the rule and the
rationale as follows:
Exemplary or punitive damages, being awarded, not by
way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way of
punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others, can
only be awarded against one who has participated in the
offence. A principal, therefore, though of course liable to
make compensation for injuries done by his agent within
the scope of his employment, cannot be held liable for
exemplary or punitive damages, merely by reason of
wanton, oppressive, or malicious intent on the part of the
agent. This is clearly shown by the judgment of this court
in the case of The Amiable Nancy ....
The Lake Shore Court continued with a long quotation from
The Amiable Nancy explaining that the "rule thus laid down is not
peculiar to courts of admiralty."38 Rather, it is a rule "of general
jurisprudence ' 39 that applies not only in maritime cases but also in
any other context in which federal common law governs.
Lake Shore is also of limited precedential value now that
federal common law governs less often than it did before Erie.
40
General maritime law is a species of federal common law, and it
remains important (as Exxon demonstrates), 4' but outside of the
maritime context there is little left for federal common law. Lake
Shore is even less helpful than The Amiable Nancy on the line-
drawing process. Even if the case establishes that a railroad is not
liable in punitive damages for the egregious misconduct of a
conductor on a train,42 the possibility remains that the actions of
36. Three Justices did not participate in the decision. See id. at 117.
37. Id. at 107-08.
38. Id. at 108.
39. Id. at 106.
40. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
42. Some have criticized Lake Shore on the ground that it was wrong even by
the standards of its own time. Indeed the Supreme Court itself has noted that "the
[Lake Shore] Court may have departed from the trend of late 19th-century
decisions." Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
575 n.14 (1982). This criticism strikes me as misguided. There is no requirement,
or even expectation, that federal common law should necessarily be consistent
with state decisions. Indeed those who are most likely to reject the Lake Shore rule
on vicarious liability for punitive damages are also most likely to applaud
admiralty's rejection of the common law contributory negligence rule (at a time
when most states barred a contributorily negligent plaintiff from any recovery).
See generally, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09 (1953)
(contrasting maritime law and common law contributory negligence rule).
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more senior employees may be attributed to the corporate
employer. Lake Shore's holding nevertheless represents a clear
rejection of the respondeat superior standard.
Moving into the modem era (and the context of constitutional
review), the Court held in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip (Haslip) that state law may award vicarious punitive
damages under the respondeat superior standard without offending
the Constitution's Due Process Clause.43 Because Haslip was
concerned with the outer limits of constitutional due process, the
decision is of limited relevance to the issue of what the law permits
when the Court has the power to determine it (let alone what the
law should permit). 44 But to the extent that language in Haslip can
be read to suggest that the normal respondeat superior standard for
tort liability is appropriate in the punitive damages context,45 it
could be viewed as some authority for broad vicarious liability for
punitive damages.46
Turning to the context of statutory interpretation the Court in
Kolstad v. American Dental Association (Koistad) rejected the
possibility of vicarious punitive damages under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.48 Kolstad is also of limited relevance to the
broader, general issue because it turned on the interpretation of the
governing statute. Moreover, the opinion sent decidedly mixed
messages. It recognized that "agency principles limit vicarious
liability for punitive awards' '49 but treated "[t]he common law as
codified in the [Restatement (Second) of Torts]" as "a useful
starting point for defining" the relevant principles.5° That approach
43. 499U.S. 1,12-15(1991).
44. Cf infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
45. The Court noted that the state's common law rule held a corporation
liable for both compensatory and punitive damages based on the fraudulent acts
of an employee acting within the scope of his employment. Haslip, 499 U.S. at
14. Because it "[could not] say that this does not rationally advance the State's
interest in minimizing fraud," the Court concluded that it "[could not] say this is
a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process." Id.
46. In Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2569-75
(2009), the Court seemed to endorse the availability of punitive damages in the
context of maintenance and cure in large measure because they were (and had
long been) a normal part of the general maritime law.
47. 527 U.S. 526, 539-46 (1999).
48. Title VII explicitly authorizes punitive damages. See 42 U.S.C. §
1981 a(b)(1) (2006) ("A complaining party may recover punitive damages under
this section against a respondent ... if the complaining party demonstrates that
the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual.").
49. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 541.
50. Id. at 542.
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would support the view that an employer could be vicariously
liable in punitive damages for the acts of a managerial employee.
The Court then rejected the Restatement approach because it would
be inconsistent with Title VII's objectives. 2 Strictly speaking, that
analysis is limited to the Title VII context, but the policy
arguments on which the Court relied would apply as strongly in
just about any non-constitutional context that the Court is likely to
face. Kolstad could easily be read to support limiting vicarious
liability for punitive damages whenever a court is free to consider
the underlying policy goals (rather than being limited to
constitutional review).
Last year the Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the
vicarious liability issue in the admiralty context again, but it was
unable to reach a conclusion. In Exxon, Exxon argued that it was
not liable to pay punitive damages for the Exxon Valdez oil spill
based solely on the wrongful conduct of the captain of the ship.
53
Exxon contended that the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach
represented the appropriate standard while the plaintiffs defended
the Restatement's "managerial employee" standard 54 that the lower
court had applied.55 The Court was equally divided on the issue
(with Justice Alito not participating),5 thus leaving the question
open.5
7
IV. VICARious LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURTS UNDER GENERAL MARITIME LAW
In the lower courts, the maritime law decisions on vicarious
liability for punitive damages are divided into three camps. Most
circuits follow the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach to hold
that a shipowner is not liable for punitive damages for the
egregious misconduct of its operational employees.5 ' In In re P&E
Boat Rentals,59 for example, a jury awarded substantial punitive
51. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
52. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544-46.
53. Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2615-16 (2008).
54. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
56. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2615-16. Presumably Justice Alito did not
participate in the decision because he owns Exxon Mobil stock.
57. Indeed, the Court went out of its way to stress that it was not resolving
the vicarious liability issue. See id. at 2616 ("[I]t should go without saying that
the disposition here is not precedential on the derivative liability question.").
58. See, e.g., In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 652 (5th Cir.
1989); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir. 1969); The
State of Missouri, 76 F. 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1896).
59. In re P & E Boat Rentals, 872 F.2d 642.
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damages against Chevron because its field foreman had acted
recklessly in ordering the captain of a crewboat to make a trip to a
work facility at high speed in heavy fog.60 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit explained that admiralty courts "generally hold that the
principal is liable in punitive damages [for the acts of an agent]
only if it authorizes or ratifies wanton actions of an agent,"
6
discussed The Amiable Nancy and Lake Shore,62 noted the relevant
decisions in other circuits,6 3 and concluded that the law's
"objectives are not achieved when courts drop the punitive damage
hammer on the principal for the wrongful acts of the simple agent
or lower echelon employee."
64
The Ninth Circuit rejected the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore
approach in Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific
Grain Growers, Inc.,65 a case involving a land-based employee, to
adopt the Restatement's "managerial agent" rule (under which an
employer is liable for punitive damages based on the misconduct66
of a managerial agent). The court did not mention The Amiable
Nancy but remarkably asserted that "[t]he Restatement standard
largely follows the earlier teaching of [Lake Shore].' '67 The true
basis for its conclusion seems to have been the belief that "the
standard of the Restatement (Second) of Torts better reflects the
reality of modem corporate America" and is more consistent with
the rule followed in most states.6 9 The Ninth Circuit later
reaffirmed and extended this holding in the Exxon Valdez
litigation, where it held that the jury was properly instructed that
the reckless act of a managerial employee "is held in law to be the
reckless act ... of the corporation."
The First Circuit adopted a middle ground in C.E.H., Inc. v.
F/V Seafarer, in which the owner of a fishing trawler was held
liable for punitive damages based on the crew's deliberate
misconduct in destroying the plaintiffs lobster traps.7 1 The court
60. Id. at 645-46.
61. Id. at 650.
62. Id. at 650-51.
63. Id. at 651-52.
64. Id. at 652.
65. 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985).
66. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
67. Protectus Alpha, 767 F.2d at 1386.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1386-87.
70. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008) (quoting
jury instructions at Phase I of In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir.
2001)).
71. 70 F.3d 694, 705 (1st Cir. 1995).
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required "some level of culpability" on the part of the employer.
72
It feared "that strict adherence to the [Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore]
complicity approach would shield a principal, who, though not
guilty of direct participation, authorization, or ratification in his
agent's egre ious conduct, nevertheless shares blame for the
wrongdoing." But it stopped "short of wholesale adoption of the
Restatement because section 909(c), read literally, could impose
liability in circumstances that do not demonstrate any fault on the
part of the principal."
74
V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER STATE
LAW
Under state law, an even wider range of different positions
exist. At one extreme are those states that either do not permit an
award of punitive damages or else limit punitive damages to very
narrow circumstances. When punitive damages are simply
unavailable, the vicarious liability issue does not even arise.
At the opposite extreme, the majority rule (or at least the
plurality rule) may be that the normal respondeat superior standard
for tort liability also applies to the imposition of punitive
damages, 76 meaning that an employer can be liable in punitive
damages for the misconduct of any employee acting in the scope of
his or her employment-without any complicity whatsoever. As
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared almost eighty years ago,





75. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997) (punitive damages
permitted only when authorized by statute); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d
472, 474 (Neb. 1975) ("It is a fundamental rule of law in this state that punitive,
vindictive, or exemplary damages are not allowed."); Fisher Props., Inc. v.
Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986) (punitive damages permitted
only when authorized by statute).
76. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4.4(B)(1) (5th ed.
2005). The Supreme Court itself has (in dicta) described the respondeat superior
standard as the majority rule. See Am. Soc'y of Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,
456 U.S. 556, 575 n. 14 (1982) ("A majority of courts... have held corporations
liable for punitive damages imposed because of the acts of their agents, in the
absence of approval or ratification."). But other sources declare that the
Restatement approach, see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text, is the
majority rule. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
77. Mayo Hotel Co. v. Danciger, 288 P. 309, 313 (Okla. 1930). Although
the Mayo Hotel Court declared that it was following the majority rule in the state
courts, it recognized that "[m]any of the state courts and a majority of the
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
At least two distinct positions exist in the middle ground
between the two extremes. Some states have followed the Amiable
Nancy-Lake Shore approach and limited responsibility for punitive
damages to those who were guilty of the misconduct, without
vicarious liability.7 8 Other states-perhaps even a majority of the
states79-- have adopted the approach reflected in the Restatements
of tort and agency law, under which an employer is liable for
punitive damages based on the misconduct of a managerial agent.
80
VI. VICARIOuS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE
RESTATEMENTS
The Restatement (Second) of Torts,81 incorporating equivalent
provisions that had originally been adopted in the earlier
Restatement (Second) of Agency,82 takes a position between the
Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore strict complicity approach and the
respondeat superior standard followed in many states. Section 909
provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master
or other principal because of an act by an agent, if, but only
if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing
and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial
agent was reckless in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal
ratified or approved the act.
83
federal courts expressly adhere to" the doctrine "that a corporation cannot be
subjected to exemplary damages because of the malicious, fraudulent, or
oppressive tortious acts of its agents and servants where such acts are not
authorized or afterwards ratified by the corporation." Id. at 312.
78. See, e.g., Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnival Co., 194 P.2d 281,
292-93 (Idaho 1948).
79. See 2 JAMES D. GHLARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PuNrIvE DAMAGES: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 24.02, at 2 (1988) ("the majority of jurisdictions follow some
form of the Restatement rule"). See also id. (declaring that "a substantial
minority of the jurisdictions" follow the respondeat superior standard).
80. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1958).
83. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, supra note 81, § 909.
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The key provision for vicarious liability is section 909(c). 84 It
recognizes that most employers today are corporations that can act
only through their employees and that at least some employees'
actions should be imputed to the corporation. Rather than limiting
the class of such employees to those responsible for setting policy,
section 909(c) expands the class to those "employed in a
managerial capacity.'
85
The Restatement (Second) of Torts does not provide much
guidance to identify managerial employees. Indeed, the Kolstad
Court declared that "no good definition of what constitutes a
"managerial capacity" has been found.",86 In Exxon, the jury was
instructed that an "employee of a corporation is employed in a
managerial capacity if the employee supervises other employees
and has responsibility for, and authority over, a particular aspect of
the corporation's business."
87
VII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE FuTURE
IN MARITIME LAW
The Supreme Court is completely free to follow its own views
of public policy in settingo~general maritime law. This is true not
only as a practical matter but also as a theoretical matter. The
Court is supposed to oversee the development of the general
maritime law following its own views of good public policy. The
Court's own recognition of this role has waned and waxed over the
years. Some scholars argued that the Court should abandon this
role,89 and many thought that the Court had, in fact, abandoned its
84. Id. § 909. Subsections (a) and (d) apply when an employer makes the
offending employee's act its own---either authorizing it (§ 909(a)) or ratifying or
approving it (§ 909(d)). Subsection (b) holds the employer responsible for its
own reckless behavior. Of course, subsections (a), (b), and (d) also impose
liability on the basis of the acts of a managerial agent, thus implicitly
incorporating the key element of subsection (c).
85. Id. § 909(c).
86. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (quoting GHIARDI &
KIRCHER, supra note 79, § 24.05, at 14).
87. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 (2008) (quoting
jury instructions at Phase I of In re The Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir.
2001)).
88. As a practical matter, the Court is free to follow its own views of public
policy in resolving almost any legal dispute-and it often does. When the Court
substitutes its own views for Congress' in the interpretation of a federal statute,
Congress will sometimes pass a new statute and overrule the prior decision. But
this is still a rare event. As a general matter, the only check on the majority's
power is self-restraint (perhaps in the face of a critical dissent).
89. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
273 (1999).
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policy-setting role in the 1990s. But in recent years the Court's
decisions in Exxon 9' and Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James
N. Kirby, Pty Ltd.92 have reasserted the traditional role. Most
recently in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend (Townsend), which
did not change the general maritime law, the Court recognized its
power to formulate general maritime law even in the face of a
federal statute that was arguably inconsistent.
93
A. The Policy
At the moment, we can only speculate on what the majority of
the Court would consider to be the appropriate public policy for
vicarious liability in the punitive damages context. In my view, the
Court should recall the most basic principles of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are not part of a plaintiffs compensation. A
plaintiff accordingly has no entitlement to recover punitive
damages. They exist, as the name implies, to be "punitive," to
punish the defendant for egregious behavior. Like other forms of
punishment under criminal law, they also deter others from
engaging in the sort of behavior that justifies an award of punitive
damages. To be effective, however, punitive damages must punish
and deter the right person. If punitive damages punish someone
who is not guilty of any misconduct they do not accomplish their
stated purpose. They instead resemble the punishment imposed on
the whipping boys of the European royal courts in the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries. 94 Similarly, unless they punish the person
90. See, e.g., John R. Brown, Admiralty Judges: Flotsam on the Sea of
Maritime Law?, 24 J. MAR. L. & COM. 249, 249 (1993) (accusing the Supreme
Court of "abandon[ing] its Constitutional duty of enunciating maritime law").
91. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2629-30 & n.21. Even the three Justices who
disagreed with the Court's exercise of its power to change the general maritime
law agreed that the Court possessed that power. See id. at 2638 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part) ("I do not question that the Court possesses the power to craft
the rule it announces today."); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part)
("beyond question" that the Court has the power to change the general maritime
law); id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part) (generally agreeing with the
Court's exercise of the power to change the general maritime law but arguing
for a "limited exception").
92. 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004).
93. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2569-75 (2009).
94. See, e.g., MARK TWAIN, THE PRINCE AND THE PAUPER 169-72 (Shelley
Fisher Fishkin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1882) (conversation between Tom
Canty, the pauper, and Humphrey Marlow, the prince's whipping boy). In
theory, the prince whose whipping boy was punished in his place would feel
some remorse as a result. It is less clear whether a reckless employee will feel
any remorse when his or her innocent employer is punished, but the employer at
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guilty of misconduct they do not deter the person who might be
tempted to commit similar misconduct.
The Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore rule ensures that punitive
damages do not punish the wrong person. If someone does not
direct the relevant misconduct, countenance it, or participate in it
in the slightest degree, that person has done nothing to justify
punishment. It is logical for that person to pay the plaintiff
compensatory damages because society's interest in ensuring that
the innocent victim of the misconduct is fully compensated
outweighs any unfairness. For punitive damages, however,
compensation has nothing to do with the analysis. The entire focus
should be on the defendant who has, by definition, done nothing
wrong whenever the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore rule applies.
Of course a Justice who wishes to apply the Amiable Nancy-
Lake Shore rule need not address the underlying policy arguments.
He or she could simply apply the rule of those cases, as they are
the Court's two directly relevant, long-standing precedents.
Although both decisions could be distinguished in any case that is
likely to come before the Supreme Court today,95 and would likely
be distinguished by any Justice who wishes to impose vicarious
liability for punitive damages, the fact remains that they are the
Court's two decisions that directly address the relevant issue as a
matter of judge-made federal law. 96 Both are unanimous 97
decisions written by well-respected members of the Court, 98 and
both unambiguously declare that punitive damages may not be
vicariously imposed on someone who "neither directed [the
underlying wrong nor countenanced it, nor participated in it in the
slightest degree." A simple application of established precedent
may not compel the application of the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore
rule today, but it certainly points in that direction.
least has a greater ability to impose adverse consequences on the reckless
employee.
95. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (explaining how The
Amiable Nancy could be distinguished). See supra notes 40, 42 and
accompanying text (explaining how Lake Shore could be distinguishable).
96. Moreover, Kolstad reaches the same result in the context of federal
statutory law. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text discussing Kolstad.
97. Cf supra note 36.
98. Indeed, "well-respected" is a glaring understatement for Justice Story,
the author of The Amiable Nancy.
99. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 559 (1818). Accord Lake
Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 108 (1893) (quoting The
Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 559).
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B. Arguments for a Special Rule in Maritime Law
Even if the Court does not agree with my policy analysis, it
might retain the Amiable Nancy--Lake Shore approach in the
maritime context based on the distinctive history of the maritime
industry. The courts and Congress have long recognized that the
industry is unique. Historically, shipowners had little control over
ships' captains, 00 who were accordingly given unprecedented
authority and independence. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA)'' and the Hater Act, 02 for example, both provide that
in certain circumstances a shipowner is not liable at all (even for
compensatory damages) when a loss is caused by the actions of the
ship's captain and crew at sea. Thus section 4(2)(a) of COGSA
excuses the shipowner from liability for its employees' acts "in the
navigation or in the management of the ship,','0 3 and section
4(2)(b) excuses the shipowner from liability for fire unless the
owner was personally at fault.104 Even if a shipowner does not
100. The force of the historical argument is clearly weaker today than it was
in the nineteenth century when the law's special protection for shipowners first
developed. A shipowner no longer sends a ship to sea with no chance for
communication until the end of the voyage. Today a ship's captain is in regular
contact with shore-based management through a wide range of technologies that
permit instantaneous voice, text, visual, and fax communication (not to mention
shore-monitoring of a ship's instruments). Cf Edgar Gold, Vessel Traffic
Regulation: The Interface of Maritime Safety and Operational Freedom, 14 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 1, 13 (1983) (describing the situation over twenty-five years
ago).
101. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (previously
codified at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-1315 (2000)).
102. See Harter Act, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified as amended at 46
U.S.C. §§ 30701-30707 (2006)).
103. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(a) (previously codified at 46
U.S.C. app. § 1304(2)(a) (2000)). The Harter Act similarly excuses the
shipowner for errors "in the navigation or management of the vessel." See 46
U.S.C. § 30706(a) (2006). The force of this argument would be considerably
weakened if the United States ratifies the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, G.A.
Res. 63/122, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/122 (Dec. 11, 2008), Annex [hereinafter
Rotterdam Rules]. Article 17 reverses the policy choice of COGSA § 4(2)(a)
and makes the shipowner liable for crew errors in the navigation or management
of the vessel.
104. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(b) (previously codified at 46
U.S.C. app. § 1304(2)(a) (2000)). The so-called "Fire Statute," which was
originally enacted in 1851 (see ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635), similarly excuses the
shipowner from liability for fire in the absence of the owner's personal fault. See
46 U.S.C. § 30504 (2006). The force of this argument would be considerably
weakened if the United States ratifies the Rotterdam Rules, supra note 103.
Article 17(3)(f) & (4)(a) reverses the policy choice of COGSA § 4(2)(b) and
makes the shipowner liable for fire due to crew errors.
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deny liability for crew negligence, the analogy to section 4(2)(a)-
(b) still illustrates why it should not be liable for punitive damages
for the actions of a captain at sea when it neither directed, nor
countenanced, nor participated to the slightest degree in any of his
misconduct. It would be anomalous indeed to hold a shipowner
vicariously liable for punitive damages based on the actions of the
captain or a member of the crew when section 4(2)(a)-(b) excuses
the shipowner from liability even for compensatory damages for
loss or damage caused by their actions (so long as the shipowner
itself was not at fault).
The maritime industry is also among the world's most
dangerous. Despite today's improved safety standards, a shipowner
puts its assets at risk in ways that few other businesses can
imagine. Both Congress and the courts have recognized that these
risks, coupled with the need to encourage investment in such a
vital industry, justify limiting a shipowner's liability in ways that
do not exist for land-based businesses. The issue here is not
whether a defendant may escape liability for compensatory
damages-although maritime law permits shipowners in other
contexts to escape liability even for compensatory damages. But
the principle of limited liability, which pervades all of maritime
law, 05 could justify the limits that the Supreme Court recognized
almost two centuries ago in The Amiable Nancy.
Finally, and most importantly, the maritime industry differs
from land-based industries in its peripatetic nature. A given vessel
is likely to call at ports in dozens of different jurisdictions every
year. Unlike a purely local business, which can adjust its conduct
to comply with whatever the rules of that locality may require, a
shipowner faces different rules in every port. To the extent that
105. The maritime law's historic reliance on limited liability is admittedly
different today than it once was. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a
shipowner might need the protection of the Limitation Act to be able to incur the
risks involved in sending a ship to sea. In today's world, a shipowner generally
protects itself from undue risk by purchasing insurance in a sophisticated market
that has developed to meet practically every imaginable need. The current
market, however, is nevertheless structured on the assumption of limited
liability. In any event, it would be unwise to impose vicarious liability for
punitive damages on the assumption that the insurance market will necessarily
solve any problems that might be created. Under the infamous Wilburn Boat
doctrine, marine insurance issues are generally determined by state law. See
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Lloyd's Underwriters of London, 972 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that state law rather than federal maritime law determines whether
punitive damages are insurable). In many states, insurance for punitive damages
is unavailable as a matter of public policy. See, e.g., Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co. v.
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (Wisdom, J.).
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those rules can be uniform, the maritime industry operates more
efficiently. 10 6 This explains the need to create a uniform maritime
rule to apply without regard to the countless variations in state
law.10 7 For maximum efficiency, the rule should be uniform not
only within the United States but internationally as well.1
08
Because most other nations do not recognize punitive damages at
all,109 it would make sense for the Court to limit the availability of
punitive damages to the extent possible in the maritime industry.
C. Arguments for Vicarious Liability
Despite the strong arguments pointing in favor of the Supreme
Court's reaffirmation of the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach,
there is no shortage of contrary arguments on which the Court
could rely if it chose to reach the opposite result. The Court-in
the absence of an established rule of general maritime law-
regularly draws on the experience of state law in formulating the
general maritime law." 0 If the Court wishes to follow what it once
characterized as the majority rule from the states in this context,"'
it could hold that the normal respondeat superior standard for tort
liability also applies to the imposition of punitive damages. 12
The Supreme Court might also wish to follow state common
law to retain as much uniformity as possible between state law and
general maritime law. 1 3 Under the so-called "saving to suitors"
clause, 114 state courts are often called upon to resolve maritime tort
106. See generally, e.g., Michael F. Sturley, Uniformity in the Law
Governing the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 26 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 553, 556-59
(1995).
107. See, e.g., Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14,
28-29 (2004).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
109. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2623-24
(2008).
110. See, e.g., Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838-39
(1996); E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864-65
(1986). This approach is admittedly less likely when the states themselves
follow a wide range of different approaches. See supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text.
111. See supra note 76.
112. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
113. This approach is less likely when the states themselves follow a wide
range of different approaches, thus making uniformity with the states
impossible. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text. Moreover, the desire
to obtain uniformity with state law must be balanced against the benefits (which
are particularly strong in the maritime context) to obtain greater uniformity with
the laws of other nations where ships travel.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (2006).
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cases. To the extent that the two bodies of law are consistent, this
can be done more efficiently.
Finally, the Court in the past has often looked to the
Restatements (particularly the Restatement (Second) of Torts) as a
source of maritime law. 15 The Court might similarly adopt the
section 909(c) standard. 116
I do not find any of these arguments favoring vicarious liability
to be particularly persuasive. It is far more likely that a Justice
would be persuaded that punitive damages serve a valuable
function and that this function would be undermined if employers
are not vicariously liable for punitive damages imposed as a result
of employee misconduct. It is undoubtedly true that fewer
plaintiffs would seek punitive damages if they could recover only
from employees (who are less likely to have the resources to pay
the damages)."17 Because punitive damages should focus on
punishing the truly guilty, not over-compensating their victims,"l 8 I
do not find this argument persuasive either. But if a Justice
supported wider availability of punitive damages as a matter of
policy, the arguments mentioned here might be used to justify the
desired result.
D. Predictions
Any prediction about the future action of the Supreme Court is
notoriously difficult. 19 If the Court is eager to resolve the
vicarious liability issue soon, however, prediction may be at least
somewhat easier. If the Exxon Court without Justice Alito was
115. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 132 (1997)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 81, § 924 cmt. d);
Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J. M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 879 (1997) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft, Preliminary
Version) (Oct. 18, 1996)); McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208-09
(1994) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 81, § 886A).
116. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
117. One must be careful not to overstate the significance of this common
sense observation. Because an employer would in any event be liable for
compensatory damages that result from its employee's egregious misconduct, cf
supra note 15 and accompanying text, one would expect plaintiffs to abandon
otherwise meritorious suits only when little harm was done (meaning that
compensatory damages would be too small to justify the suit) and it is clear that
the employer was not itself at fault.
118. Cf supra note 1 and accompanying text.
119. I doubt many observers would have predicted that Justice Thomas
would write the opinion upholding punitive damages in Atlantic Sounding Co. v.
Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561 (2009), particularly when the rest of the Court's
conservative bloc was in dissent.
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equally divided, 120 then Justice Alito would presumably have had
the deciding vote if the issue had come before the Court during the
2008 Term (before Justice Souter's retirement). Because the issue
has not yet returned to the Court, it will be necessary to speculate
about the views not only of Justice Alito but also of at least Justice
Souter and Justice Sotomayor.
Assuming that the Exxon Court was in fact equally divided,' 2'
it seems likely that four of the five Justices in the majority favored
the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach and that all three of the
dissenting Justices would have rejected that approach. Of the five
Justices in the majority, most observers would predict that Justice
Souter would have been the most likely to have rejected the
Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach. 122 Justice Sotomayor has
not yet faced this issue in her judicial career,1 23 but most observers
would also predict that she would be more likely to reject the
Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach. If all of these predictions
are accurate, 1 4 and no one has a change of heart, 25 then Justice
120. It is at least possible that the Court was not as equally divided as it
claimed. Under the procedural posture in Exxon, reversing the Ninth Circuit on
the vicarious liability issue would have required a new trial in which the new
jury would have been required to decide whether Exxon's own actions (as
opposed to its captain's) were sufficiently blameworthy to justify punitive
damages-a result that the Court may have hesitated to reach in such a high-
profile case. Motivated by a desire to end the long-running litigation, one of the
Justices who in fact opposed vicarious liability may have been willing to "switch
sides" and resolve the case on the remaining issues, or the eight participating
Justices may even have agreed to divide equally without taking a formal vote.
121. Cf supra note 119.
122. The fact that Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Exxon offers
some support for this view. If Chief Justice Roberts had perceived Justice Souter
to be the "weak vote" in the case, he would have been more likely to assign the
majority opinion to him to ensure that he did not change his vote after the
opinions were circulated within the Court. Such a last-minute change would
have deprived the majority of its essential fifth vote and resulted in the Ninth
Circuit's entire judgment being affirmed by an equally divided Court.
123. Earlier in her judicial career, Justice Sotomayor participated in several
cases in which punitive damages were at issue, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v.
Uzan, 509 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2007), including at least one case in which she
awarded punitive damages. See Linkers (Far East) Pte., Ltd. v. Int'l Polymers,
Inc., No. 94 CIV. 9226 (SS), 1996 WL 412854, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 23,
1996).
124. Of course, if Justice Sotomayor accepts the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore
approach and Justice Souter did not, then there would be a majority for that
approach regardless of Justice Alito's views. Conversely, if Justice Sotomayor
rejects the Amiable Nancj-Lake Shore approach and Justice Souter accepted it,
then there would be a majority for at least some form of vicarious liability
regardless of Justice Alito's views.
125. It is entirely possible that one of the Exxon dissenters, although
unwilling to see the company avoid punitive damages for the Exxon Valdez spill,
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Alito would still have the deciding vote (until another member of
the Exxon majority retires).
Justice Alito has not yet expressed his views on vicarious
liability for punitive damages, but he has signaled his more general
dislike of punitive damages. His dissent in Townsend bends over
backwards to deny punitive damages in the context of maintenance
and cure. 126 To justify that result, he would have expanded the
reach of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.12 7 and taken a very restricted
view of the history of punitive damages in maritime law.12 The
might be willing to support the Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach in a
different case. Justice Breyer (unlike the other two Exxon dissenters) agreed
with the Court's general approach to limiting punitive damages, disagreeing
only with the application of that approach to the specific facts. See Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2640 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting in
part). It is instructive to note the basis for Justice Breyer's disagreement with the
Court's result. He explained:
[T]his was no mine-run case of reckless behavior. The jury could
reasonably have believed that Exxon knowingly allowed a relapsed
alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with millions of gallons of
oil through waters that provided the livelihood for the many plaintiffs
in this case. Given that conduct, it was only a matter of time before a
crash and spill like this occurred.
Id. The problem, of course, is that this rationale for rejecting the Court's result is
inconsistent with the basis for the Court's opinion. The standard was not what
"[t]he jury could reasonably have believed" but what the jury, following its
instructions, actually found. If the jury had actually found that Exxon had
"knowingly allowed a relapsed alcoholic repeatedly to pilot a vessel filled with
millions of gallons of oil through [Prince William Sound]," then there would
have been no question of vicarious liability.
If Justice Breyer dissented from the Court's ultimate holding because he
believed (despite the absence of a jury finding) that the company itself had acted
recklessly, it is plausible to imagine that this belief might also have influenced
his views on the vicarious liability issue. Perhaps the Amiable Nancy-Lake
Shore approach would be more appealing to him in a case in which he accepted
that the employer was in fact innocent of any wrongdoing.
126. At. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 129 S. Ct. 2561, 2575-79 (2009)
(Alito, J., dissenting).
127. 498 U.S. 19 (1990). In Miles, the Court held that it would not recognize
remedies under a cause of action that it had created under the general maritime
law when Congress had not provided those remedies in prior analogous statutes.
See id. at 30-36. Justice Alito argued that the Court should withhold a remedy
that has long been recognized as available under the general maritime law
because Congress subsequently provided an additional cause of action for the
same wrong that in his view did not provide that remedy. See Townsend, 129 S.
Ct. at 2575-79 (Alito, J., dissenting).
128. The central basis for the Court's holding in Townsend was that punitive
damages have long been an available remedy at common law and under the
general maritime law, and nothing in maritime law undermines the general rule
in the context of maintenance and cure. See Townsend, 129 S. Ct. at 2569.
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Townsend Court was, to be sure, facing a very different issue than
the vicarious liability question that is our focus here. But it strikes
me as extremely unlikely that a Justice who was so opposed to
awarding punitive damages at all in that context (when the
historical argument in their favor was strong enough to persuade
Justice Thomas) would be sympathetic to holding an employer
vicariously liable for punitive damages (when the Court's prior
precedents point clearly in the opposite direction).
VIII. VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THE FUTURE
IN GENERAL LAW
Although I see no reason to predict any independent new
developments on the subject under general tort law, it is quite
plausible to believe that there may soon be new developments on
vicarious liability for punitive damages in maritime law. 129 The
Supreme Court seems to have been particularly fond of punitive
damages cases in recent years,' 30 and one of the best indications
that the Court is likely to grant certiorari on a particular issue is
that it previously agreed to decide that issue but was for some
reason unable to resolve it.131 But what influence would a Supreme
Indeed, lower court decisions from the relevant time "appear to contain at least
some punitive element" in the maintenance and cure context. Id. Justice Alito,
on the other hand, finds this reasoning "flawed" because none of the early
decisions clearly award punitive damages in the maintenance and cure context.
See id. at 2578-79 (Alito, J., dissenting). Yet he offers no reason to distinguish
maintenance and cure from other maritime law contexts in which he does not
dispute that punitive damages were available.
129. Even if the Supreme Court does not itself revisit the vicarious liability
issue in the near future, the prominence given to the issue in Exxon may well
bring the issue before the lower courts more frequently. And the Court's
treatment of the issue may well encourage the lower courts to explore the issue
more deeply.
130. In the two decades since Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
over a dozen punitive damages cases. Although that is already a remarkable
frequency, the pace seems, if anything, to be accelerating. In the last two terms,
the Court has granted certiorari in three punitive damages cases. In addition to
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, both of
which are discussed above, the Court granted certiorari in Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 128 S. Ct. 2904 (2008) (granting certiorari to 176 P.3d 1255 (2008)), but
dismissed the writ after oral argument.
131. See, e.g., EUGENE GRESSMAN, KENNETH S. GELLER, STEPHEN M.
SHAPIRO, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP & EDWARD A. HARTNETT, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 6.31(b), at 480 (9th ed. 2007). The single biggest obstacle to the
Court's deciding the vicarious liability question, it seems, is the availability of a
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Court admiralty 132 decision on the subject have outside of the
maritime field?
As a technical matter such a decision would be binding only in
future maritime cases. 13 ' It would not bind state or federal courts
addressing punitive damages questions under state law-which is,
of course, the context in which most punitive damages questions
arise. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that the lower courts
would ignore the decision. A state supreme court considering
whether a defendant is vicariously liable for a punitive damages
award under state common law would be in essentially the same
position as the United States Supreme Court in a maritime case
(assuming that no statute is relevant). Even if such a state supreme
court is not bound by the federal decision, it could still find the
opinion persuasive and thus follow its reasoning as a matter of
state common law.
If state courts do follow the federal precedent (when it is
eventually decided), it would not be the first time that prominent
decisions in admiralty have influenced the wider development of
the law. Admiralty courts led the way, for example, in breaking
down the old common law contributory negligence rule.134 Judge
Learned Hand's now-famous B<PL "formula"' 35 was announced
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,136 an admiralty case. It
now lies at the heart of negligence law in most states. The seminal
decision for the economic loss rule in general tort law is Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,137 another admiralty case.
suitable case. Judging from the reported decisions in the lower courts, the issue
does not arise that frequently.
132. For the Court to rule on the validity of vicarious liability for punitive
damages as a matter of general principle, the case would almost certainly have
to arise under maritime law. If a case arose under state law, the Court could
address only the constitutionality of the state's rule-and the Court has already
ruled that it does not violate due process to vicariously impose punitive damages
on an employer. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)
(limiting holding to admiralty context).
134. See generally, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 408-09
(1953) (contrasting maritime law and common law contributory negligence rules).
135. The B<PL formula addresses whether particular conduct is negligent by
asking whether the burden of precautions to avoid an accident (B) would have
been less than the expected loss from the accident (L) discounted by the
probability of the accident's occurrence (P).
136. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). A decade and a half earlier, Judge
Hand had foreshadowed the B<PL formula in The Glendola, 47 F.2d 206 (2d
Cir. 1931), another admiralty case.
137. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
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To take a more recent example, in the years before The Bremen
v. Zapata Offshore Co 138 forum selection clauses were almost
universally disfavored. 19 But The Bremen and two subsequent
maritime decisions upholding forum selection clauses 140 have
resulted in a complete sea change, ultimately persuading the courts
of almost every state to routinely enforce forum selection clauses.
Even though the Bremen Court explicitly limited its holding to
federal courts sitting in admiralty,14 lower courts applied the
decision much more expansively. 142
Even more recently, the Supreme Court's decision in
McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde143 has defined how the legal system
calculates the liability of nonsettling defendants in the context of
joint and several liability after a plaintiff accepts a partial
settlement in a case. 144 Prior to the Court's decision, views were
sharply divided over whether the nonsettling defendants' liability
should be calculated with reference to the jury's allocation of
proportionate responsibility or by giving them a dollar-for-dollar
credit for the amount of the settlement. But once the McDermott
Court chose the proportionate share approach, the legal system
largely followed suit.1
46
138. The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.
139. See generally, e.g., Ingrid M. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-
A Brief Survey of Anglo-American Law, 8 INT'L LAW. 83, 93-95 (1974); James
T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in International and Interstate Contracts,
65 KY. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1976); Note, Validity of Contractual Stipulation Giving
Exclusive Jurisdiction to the Courts of One State, 45 YALE L.J. 1150, 1150 &
n.2 (1936).
140. See Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MN Sky Reefer, 515 U.S.
528 (1995); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
141. The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10.
142. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L.
REv. 291,293-96 (1988).
143. 511 U.S. 202 (1994).
144. See, e.g., Martin Davies, McDermott v. AmClyde: The Quiet Achiever-
The Eighth Nicholas J. Healy Lecture on Admiralty Law-Admiralty's Greatest
Hits May 3rd, 2007, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 11, 11-12 (2008) (noting the influence
of McDermott v. AmClyde "outside of maritime law").
145. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 81, § 886A
(describing three alternative approaches-two of which involved a dollar-for-
dollar credit for the settlement amount and one of which turned on the jury's
allocation of proportionate responsibility-but declining to take a position on
the issue).
146. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILrrY § 16 cmt. c (2000) (arguing that the proportionate share approach is
preferable and noting that the "United States Supreme Court, after thoroughly
canvassing the respective advantages and disadvantages of these two systems,
chose a comparative-share credit for Admiralty cases").
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It is, of course, premature to predict how influential a
hypothetical future Supreme Court decision may be. Many factors
would undoubtedly influence the prediction. In the meantime,
however, we may have some clue of what future developments
might be in store when we see how state courts react to Exxon.14 7 If
state courts find Exxon an influential decision in limiting the size
of punitive damages awards, it seems likely that they would also
find an opinion accepting or rejecting the Amiable Nancy-Lake
Shore approach to be influential.
147. Exxon Shipping v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).

